earthquake and an enormous tsunami, over 13 m in height, which together killed over 20,500 people and resulted in the evacuation of over 320,000 people from the devastated areas. This paper describes the damage sustained by the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant during this unpredicted major natural disaster and the events that happened in the months after this accident. The events occurring at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant, the actions taken to minimize the effects of the damage to the plant and to protect the public, and the points at which the responses proved to be inadequate all offer lessons that will be of value to those planning for and responding to future natural disasters and accidents in Japan and around the world.
INTRODUCTION
The Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant was struck by an earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011. This paper describes the ensuing events and what happened at Fukushima-Daiichi in the months after this unpredicted major natural disaster. The events occurring at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant, the actions taken to minimize the effects of the damage to the power plant and to protect the public, and the points at which the responses proved to be inadequate all offer lessons that will be of value to those planning for and responding to future natural disasters and accidents, not only in Japan but also around the world. Figure 1 shows the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant before the disaster. On March 11, the most massive earthquake ever recorded in Fukushima occurred. This magnitude 9.0 earthquake was the first of a series of many earthquakes. Historically, this earthquake is ranked fourth on records listing all earthquakes around the world since 1900. By the end of June, about 20,500 people in eastern Japan had been reported to be missing or dead. More than 320,000 people were evacuated from their homes in towns and villages because of the earthquake and the resulting tsunami.
The Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant was located on the coast that was devastated by this earthquake and tsunami. At the site of the Fukushima-Daiichi plant, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco) had constructed tidal embankments 5.2 m in height to protect the FukushimaDaiichi nuclear power plant from tsunamis. However, a huge tsunami, more than 13 m high, struck the plant.
THE EVENTS AT FUKUSHIMA-DAIICHI AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI OF MARCH 11, 2011
Figure 2A shows the 13-m tsunami flowing over the 5.2-m tidal embankments. The tidal embankments were not effective in protecting the plant because the tsunami was so much higher than embankment. A tank standing 4 m above sea level on the ground 4 m above sea level, marked on Fig.  2A as ''a,'' is shown partially submerged during the tsunami on Fig. 2B . Many cars were swept away by the tsunami, and the tank was damaged by this debris as well as by the force of the raging water (Fig. 2Ca) . The swirling seawater also covered two tanks near the central waste treatment facility of unit 4 (Fig. 2D ). These two tanks were 4-5 m high. The tops of the tanks were 10 m above the original sea level. They sank completely below the elevated seawater levels (Fig. 2E ). When the tsunami fell back, the water deposited a car between the tanks and the destroyed building (Fig. 2F ).
SCRAM AND EMERGENCY POWER EQUIPMENT BLACK-OUT
The first earthquake (magnitude 9.0) struck the plant at 14:46 on March 11, 2011. Electricity supplies from outside the plant were lost immediately. One minute later, all systems were stopped by the insertion of controllers at 14:47. Reactors 1-3 were shut down in response to the earthquake. This response is called a ''Scram.'' The emergency diesel generators designed to power the cooling systems, located in the basements of the turbine buildings, started up and powered these emergency systems for 52 min. However, at 15:39 the huge tsunami disabled all of the emergency diesel power generators inside the plant (Fig.  3A) . The tsunami also destroyed heat removal pumps in units 1-3. After this, only battery power was available. The batteries were intended to protect against short electrical outages and were not capable of driving the main cooling system for a prolonged period. The batteries were apparently depleted in about 8 h. The complete loss of electrical power systems created severe problems and resulted in a significant release of radiation. The timing of the Scram (Fig. 3B , red arrow) and the power system blackout (SBO) (Fig. 3B , blue arrow) were measured and documented by radiation workers in the plant.
REACTOR DAMAGE AND COOLING DOWN
Until the end of March, Tepco and the Japanese ministry only proposed cooling down the reactors. Many people asked if there was a meltdown of the reactor core in the reactor building (Fig. 4A) . However, until May, the Japanese government said that a serious event such as a meltdown had not occurred (Fig. 4B) . Tepco and the government suggested that the occurrence of such a serious event was only speculation. Because there was no way to observe the interior of the reactor directly, the engineers had to assess whether such an event had occurred by extrapolating from measurements of high temperatures and radioisotope leakage. It was initially decided to remove the steam from the reactors by using manual labor. However, this effort was interrupted after the detection of high levels of radioactivity. There was no electric power available from outside the plant during this period, and the emergency diesel electric generators had been destroyed by the tsunami. Thus Tepco and the government had to assume that if a meltdown had occurred, it had resulted from delays in removing the steam.
On May 24, Tepco reported that the reactor containment structure in unit 1 might have been damaged and that the fuel might have descended to the bottom of the unit. This was deduced from observations of a high temperature of 2,8008C and high pressure. In unit 3, it is possible that these conditions occurred two times on March 14 and again 10 days later. High radioactivity levels (about 2 Sv/h) were detected on the first floor in the unit 1 reactor building on May 14. Units 2 and 3 were still being cooled down with water. However, on May 15, these high radiation conditions were considered to be quite serious, and this inhibited progress in cooling down the reactor units.
HYDROGEN EXPLOSIONS
On the afternoon of the next day after the earthquake, March 12, Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) TV documented the first hydrogen explosion, which occurred in unit 1 at 15:36 (Fig. 5A) . The next explosion occurred in unit 3 at 11:01 a.m. on March 14 (Fig. 5B) . The third explosion occurred in unit 4 at 5:45 a.m. on March 16. The figures show the destruction occurring in the reactor buildings of unit 1 (Fig. 5C ), unit 3 (Fig. 5E ) and unit 4 (Fig. 5F ). In unit 2, smoke was observed, but the building appeared to remain intact (Fig. 5D) .
NHK TV also broadcast a photo on May 19 (Fig. 6 ). In this image, units 1, 3 and 4 are clearly severely damaged. Unit 2 suffered serious damage to the internal spent fuel storage areas. An explosion in unit 4 resulted from the production in unit 3 of hydrogen gas that moved into unit 4 through tunnels between these units.
RADIOACTIVITY AT PLANT MONITORING POSTS
Monitoring for radioactivity showed radioactivity at many monitoring posts around the plant (Fig. 7) . The government responded quickly by designating evacuation areas; these were announced through TV broadcasts. At 20:50 on March 11, a 2-km evacuation area was announced. At 21:23, the evacuation area was expanded to 3 km, and the region between 3-10 km was designated as an indoor shelter area. The first explosion at unit 1 increased the extent of the radioactivity contamination in the air. The indoor evacuation area was therefore expanded to 20 km at 18:25 the next day. The second explosion in unit 3 also led to an increase of radioactivity in the air. The destruction in the spent fuel storage area in unit 2 increased radioactive contamination even more. The next information broadcast at 11:06 on March 13 expanded the indoor evacuation area to include the region between 20 and 30 km. The third explosion at unit 4 led to much higher levels of radioactivity. TV coverage clearly illustrated the challenge of lowering the high temperatures in reactors in units 1, 2 and 3 and in the spent fuel pool in unit 4 by using seawater delivered by helicopters and fire trucks. Subsequently, seawater was replaced with fresh salt-free water.
On May 16, Tepco and the Japanese government announced that radioactivity levels of 290 mSv/h had been detected in the reactor building of unit 1 at 21:51 on March 11. Tepco speculated that these radioisotopes had been transported by the exploding hydrogen gas. If this was the reason for the spread of the radioactivity, Tepco hoped to prevent any additional spreading of radioactivity by preventing any new explosions.
RADIOISOTOPE CONTAMINATION WAS DEFINED AS LEVEL 7
Large amounts of radioisotopes were widely dispersed in the air, soil, fresh water, food and seawater over eastern Japan. Based on these observations, the scale of this accident was set at IAEA level 7 on April 10. The contaminated area covered 800 km 2 (a size about one-fourth of the area of Tokyo) and is wider than the evacuation area designated after the Chernobyl accident. On August 22, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency calculated that about 590,000 TBq of radioactivity was widely distributed through the air. On April 23, Tepco announced that there were many radioisotope-contaminated areas producing exposure levels of more than 100 mSv/h around all of the power plant's units (Fig. 8) . A rather high level of radioisotope contamination was detected, with exposure levels of 900 mSv/h produced from the rubble around unit 3. Such contamination could have been produced by the explosions or by the destruction of the reactor in unit 2.
On July 31, Tepco announced that very highly contaminated regions were detected with a gamma camera at the exhaust ducts between unit 2 and unit 3. The levels were DISASTER AT JAPAN'S FUKUSHIMA-DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT about 10 Sv/h. At the time this is being written, Tepco was working on decontamination and transfer of radioisotopecontaminated materials in the plant. On August 17, the radioactivity at a west gate of the plant had decreased to about 20% of the levels observed at the end of June.
SYSTEM FOR PREDICTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY DOSE INFORMATION (SPEEDI)
After Tepco released data from many monitoring posts, the patterns of the spread of radioisotope contaminants were simulated using software called SPEEDI. The wind moved toward the ocean on March 12. Many monitoring posts were used around the Tokyo area too, and radioisotope contamination was detected during monitoring done on March 15. The combined analysis using SPEEDI and the monitor post data produced the simulation patterns of the spreading radioisotope contamination after the explosion on March 15 at the plant shown on Fig. 9 . Radioisotope contamination spread in a broad pattern toward the South at the indicated times.
RADIOISOTOPE CONTAMINATION MAP
American military personnel measured radioactivity around the plant from aircraft during the period March 17-19. On March 22, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announced that high levels of radioisotope contamination were detected in areas to the northwest of Fukushima-Daiichi. The values reported were under 300 mSv per hour but were greater than 1 mSv for 8 h. This value is the yearly limit for the general public according to the International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommendations (1).
On May 6, the Japanese government issued an ''Accumulated radioisotope contamination map over land surfaces.'' 
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This map was produced by Japan and the U.S. DOE from the dosimetry acquired for 1-2-km regions from an elevation of 150-700 m using aircraft and helicopters. These data were very useful in deciding which areas would be evacuated. They showed that 137 Cs was present at levels over 3-15 million Bq, and therefore the government had to consider expanding the evacuation areas because after the Chernobyl accident areas containing more than 0.555 million Bq of 137 Cs had been declared to be evacuation areas.
Radioisotope contamination was also measured at a height of 1 m above the ground to determine the dose in air over a 2-km-square grid in more detail from June 6-July 8 (Fig. 10) . By acquiring these data, the collaborating radiation physics groups provided a major contribution to the measurement of environmental radiation.
The Japan Atomic Energy Agency reported on effective doses from external exposure. These doses were calculated for 2 months after the event. Radioisotopes were spread widely in eastern Japan and into the Pacific Ocean (Fig. 11) .
CRITERIA FOR AVOIDING RADIATION EXPOSURE
The basic concepts and criteria defining protection from radiation were proposed by the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan (Fig. 12) . In a normal situation (Standard A), 1 mSv/year is the limit. The level of radiation produced by normal operation of a nuclear power plant is to be maintained as low as possible. The next standard (Standard B) is defined for avoiding large radiation exposures during the early stage of an accident: indoor sheltering is acceptable in the presence of up to 10 mSv, and evacuation is required in the presence of 50 mSv. Standard C is defined for radiation protection in an emergency situation (e.g. an accident). Exposures are limited to 20-100 mSv/year. Radiation protection limits (Standard D) are defined for a situation in which contamination is still present after an accident and exposure should be limited to 1-20 mSv/year. The long-term aim in normal situations is to limit exposures to 1 mSv/year (Standard E).
EVACUATION AREAS
Evacuation areas were dependent primarily on the distance from the plant (Fig. 13) . The government first decided that there would be four primary types of evacuation areas: a prohibited area (red circle; less than 3 km from the plant), an on-alert area (3 km to 20 km from the plant), an evacuation-prepared area (20 km to 30 km from the plant), and a deliberate evacuation area to the northwest of the plant. These designations were based on accumulated radioactivity levels being higher than 20 mSv. The Japanese ministry and ICRP recommend that exposure levels be set below this value. In addition, a member of the ministry announced that ''when the plant's environment is again under control, lifting the evacuation rules can be considered. However, for the people from the designated active evacuation areas, there is no immediate prospect of this in sight.'' Other potentially dangerous areas were defined later, DISASTER AT JAPAN'S FUKUSHIMA-DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT after radiation hot spots were found (white circles). In total, almost 120,000 people were evacuated from their towns and villages by April 23. Figure 14 shows the daily ambient dose rates at specific locations in Fukushima prefecture. The highest radioactivity levels were detected at Iitate village. This village is included in a deliberate evacuation area. Other high-level areas are shown in the figure. The differences in radioisotope contamination were dependent on wind direction, rain, snow, and mountains and landforms. Radioactivity at each village and city gradually decreased throughout the monitoring period shown, which ended April 9.
DAILY AMBIENT DOSE RATE IN FUKUSHIMA PREFECTURE

WARNING ABOUT TAP WATER
On March 23, the ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare reported levels of radioactivity from 131 I in tap water from various parts of Tokyo; these levels included readings of 103-210 Bq per kilogram. The Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan announced that it had set 300 Bq per kilogram Cs as the current standards for drinking water. These levels would not cause health effects if consumed continuously for 1 year. However, there is a separate limit of 100 Bq per kilogram for 131 I in milk, to be applied for babies and children, because the iodine localizes in the thyroid, where the concentrated radioactivity can lead to cancer. Six prefectures in eastern Japan decided to advise against the use of tap water for babies and children for about 10 days in March. In the city of Tokyo, avoidance of tap water for babies and children was advised on only 1 day.
RADIOISOTOPE CONTAMINATION IN FOOD
Radioisotope contamination in some 134 samples of various types of foods from 12 prefectures around eastern Japan was detected after the explosion, on March 23. These samples included a variety of fruits, leafy vegetables (e.g. spinach, cabbage), flower head vegetables (e.g. broccoli, cauliflower), shiitake mushrooms and milk as well as beef and pork. A chief cabinet secretary said, ''At the moment these vegetables are not harmful to people's health.'' However, the government decided to prevent the distribution and sale of radioisotope-contaminated food from Fukushima prefecture and areas around Fukushima. After the middle of April, radioactive contamination was no longer detectable in food, and the government therefore modified and relaxed the strict rules preventing these foods from reaching any markets. However, on May 15-20, radioisotope contamination was found in green tea leaves in widely distributed areas in many cities over five prefectures, including Chiba and Shizuoka, which are at distances of 200-300 km from Fukushima. On July 2, NHK TV reported that cesium contamination had been found in green tea leaves but not in the roots of the plants. This contamination might have occurred on March 15. In addition, even in the middle of July, cesium contamination was found in beef cattle that had been fed rice straw. As a result, the government decided to prohibit the sale of such beef in the markets.
WATER SUPPLIES, RADIOISOTOPE LEAKAGE AND RADIOISOTOPE DISCHARGES IN THE PLANT
Since large amounts of water were required to continuously cool the Fukushima-Daiichi plant, contaminated water containing high concentrations of radioisotopes leaked from structural cracks and through structural holes and tunnels, particularly from unit 2 on March 26 (Fig. 15) . Tepco is still working even now to cool down these three reactors and the spent fuel pool in unit 4. Initially, they were cooled with seawater (blue arrows). The peak activity was 4,700 trillion Bq in 520 tons of water containing radioactive iodine and cesium on April 1 (Fig. 15, C) . From this information, it is thought that the radioisotope contaminants included 2.05 3 10 4 tons, 2.5 3 10 4 tons, 2.2 3 10 4 tons and 2 3 10 4 tons of material from the turbine buildings and the tunnels in units 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively (A). Consequently, Tepco worked to stop this leakage (D). To transfer the highly contaminated water to a tank (yellow arrows), Tepco discharged about 10,000 tons of less highly contaminated water from this tank directly into the sea, resulting in a relatively low level of contamination of 150 billion Bq (B). East Asian countries (Korea, Russia and China) complained about this discharge, because the Japanese government did not provide any information to them. On May 4, the government announced that the contamination was about 100 times above the permitted levels for seawater at 30 km from the seashore. The contamination was also found to be at levels 29 times higher than normal in small fish on April 18. The Japanese military prevented these fish from reaching consumers. Tepco installed six silt fences (E) or ''water curtains'' between the tidal embankment and the sea to prevent radioisotope leakage. In addition, Tepco prepared a 10,000-ton mega-float or barrier (F) to contain the contaminated seawater and the radioactivity in many tanks on land at Fukushima-Daiichi. Tepco also prepared temporary tidal embankments to prevent more damage from occurring (G).
MONITORING POSTS IN TSUKUBA CITY
Radioactivity was not detectable in the air around Tokyo before the end of March. In Tsukuba city, about 165 km south of Fukushima-Daiichi, elevated dose rates from the accident were monitored using 1-h sampling intervals. These elevated dose rates were later completely eliminated, and measurements on May 20 and afterward showed only normal background (Fig. 16A) . Radioactivity from many types of materials found in the reactors, including cesium, iodine, tellurium and technetium, was undetectable (Fig.  16B) .
RADIATION EXPOSURE TO RADIATION WORKERS
On July 1, Tepco announced that six radiation workers had been exposed to more than the limit of 250 mSv set by the government. Tepco has released the results of further   FIG. 10 . Radioisotope contamination at a height of 1 m above the ground from June 6-July 8. examinations of two control rooms in the plant. Tests at the National Institute of Radiological Sciences (NIRS) indicated that one of the men received a total dose of 678 mSv (an external dose of 88 mSv and an internal dose of 590 mSv), while the second worker received a total dose of 643 mSv (103 mSv externally and 540 mSv internally). NIRS also confirmed that the two workers had no health problems as a result of their exposures. Three other contractors had installed cables in the first floor and basement of the turbine building of unit 3 and stood in contaminated water, resulting in exposures of 241, 227 and 179 mSv to the skin on their legs. On June 22, Tepco said that it planned to examine the radiation exposures of approximately 3,700 workers who had worked at the plant since March 11. So far, medical checks have been made on 3,514 workers. These examinations showed that 124 of them had received radiation doses above 100 mSv. Of these, 107 workers had received doses between 100 and 200 mSv, while eight workers had received doses of 200 to 250 mSv.
On April 27, it was reported that two female non-radiation workers were exposed to 7 and 18 mSv. The rule for women allows a maximum exposure of 5 mSv over 3 months. On May 1, the Japanese government announced that four other women were exposed to 2-3 mSv. A total of 19 women worked in the plant, and five were non-radiation workers who were exposed to more than 1 mSv.
RADIATION CHEMICAL RESEARCH FOR THE FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT
A report, ''Radiation chemical research reports of hydrogen formation in water purification systems using zeolite,'' was authored by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and is now available. Zeolite is a powerful and effective adsorbent for radioactive cesium because of its high adsorption capacity and radiation resistance; it is used in a purification system in the Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. It is therefore important to evaluate hydrogen formation resulting from gamma radiolysis of contaminated water containing fission products and seawater during the processing and storage of the waste. The JAEA is also conducting R&D on environmental recovery technology that can be used to remove radioactive substances. Typical R&D topics are environmental purification technologies using cesium adsorbents and technologies using polyions and bentonite to immobilize and remove cesium contamination in soil.
Another topic is the development of radiation-resistant robots that can be used for the measurement of radiation. This work is being assisted and enhanced by volunteers from universities, research institutes and companies. These techniques can contribute to the direct measurement and monitoring of high levels of radioactive contamination by using robots.
PREVENTING ADDITIONAL ACCIDENTS
To avoid any new hydrogen explosions, Tepco was given permission to inject nitrogen gas into the reactor vessels beginning on April 7. According to a company press release, this action was considered as a way to displace oxygen and therefore reduce the risk of explosions.
To cool down the reactor with water, products from France and the U.S. were applied to new circulation and cleaning systems. In the middle of July, the government stated that these efforts to achieve step 1 on the roadmap to 
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Step 2 on the roadmap to recovery was also described; its primary goals are further stabilization of the reactors and removal of radioisotope-contaminated debris from the plant. However, the earthquakes in these areas have produced frequent aftershocks, which continue at the present time and hinder these efforts.
DELAY IN PROVIDING NEWS AND INFORMATION
Dissemination of news and information from the government and Tepco was often delayed (Fig. 17) . In particular, shortly after the accident, people around the plant should have been made completely aware of any radioisotope contamination. The Japanese nation and the evacuees have complained frequently that critical information from the Japanese government reached them too slowly. The government should endeavor to dispense important information more rapidly to the Japanese people and to the world. Since people may have received limited or inadequate information from TV and the newspapers, many people from foreign countries who were present in Japan departed from Japan through Narita airport during the first several days after the accident. In addition, the number of tourists from foreign countries decreased noticeably. Japanese exports, which are an important part of Japan's economy, also suffered, and many problems developed for businesses involved in exports. These events added to the other economic problems that Japan is facing. In the face of these facts, in May, the government provided explanations for the delay in providing information concerning this event.
NUCLEAR ENERGY PLANTS IN JAPAN
At the end of July, there were 18 operating nuclear plants and 35 nonoperating plants in Japan, and 1 plant was being inspected (Fig. 18) . All of these power plants are located on the coasts and therefore face the possibility of experiencing of an earthquake and/or tsunami. The most recent information available concerns the Hamaoka nuclear power plant located on the southwest coast about 200 km from Tokyo. On May 6, the Chubu Electric Power Company agreed to comply with a request from the prime minister to DISASTER AT JAPAN'S FUKUSHIMA-DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT close this plant. Currently, the future of other nuclear power plants under construction or in planning stages is completely unknown. Japan must begin discussions about using electric energy from sources such as solar, wind, natural gas and other designs as well as from nuclear energy.
REQUIRED TASKS
A number of tasks requiring long-term efforts still remain. These include:
1. Cooling down the reactors and shielding the environment from radioisotopes escaping from the plant. 2. Performing more detailed dosimetry studies. 3. Decontamination and transfer of radioisotope-contaminated materials. These include soil, water, houses, schools, shops, industrial facilities and anything else affected by the accident.
4. Returning all of the evacuees to their hometowns and villages. 5. Providing health care and monitoring for the public in Fukushima prefecture and for radiation workers in the plant over the long term.
SUMMARY
The events occurring at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant, the actions taken to minimize the effects of the damage to the power plant and to protect the public, and the points at which these responses proved to be inadequate all offer lessons of value. Some of the factors that led to this accident appear to be:
1. Fukushima-Daiichi, like most nuclear power plants in Japan, is located on the coast. 2. The massive earthquake, the fourth largest since 1900, had a magnitude 9.0. DISASTER AT JAPAN'S FUKUSHIMA-DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 13 3. A huge tsunami, more than 13 m in height, overwhelmed the 5.2-m tidal embankments protecting the plants. 4. All electricity from outside of the plant was lost for several weeks. In addition, the on-site diesel electric power generators were disabled by the massive tsunami. 5. Numerous committees involved in the planning and regulation of nuclear power plants in Japan were not able to foresee the scale of the natural disaster that led to the accident or to prevent this accident.
The earthquake and tsunami in northeastern Japan exceeded long-held assumptions made during the planning and construction of these nuclear power plants. Japan's scientists and engineers must learn from these events, begin anew from this incident, and plan more efficiently and effectively for the future.
